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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of monetary incentives on 
user onboarding in online sharing platforms. 
Specifically, drawing upon the literature of monetary 
incentives, privacy, and consumer behavior, we 
conduct a randomized field experiment to explore 
users’ initial engagement and interaction with an 
online car-sharing platform. Our empirical analyses 
show that monetary incentives are no better than 
simple email reminders in encouraging users’ self-
disclosure of private information nor their active 
engagement with the platform (i.e., actual booking via 
the platform). Our work sheds new light on the heated 
debate over the design and deployment of monetary 
incentives in digital platforms, and provides useful 
implications for both academia and the industry. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The internet-based markets play a critical role in 
today’s economy. They have greatly increased the 
variety of product and service offerings, and improved 
the efficiency of the exchange of information, goods, 
services and payments [1]. Most recently, the 
proliferation of digital platforms, such as Airbnb and 
Uber, have made the sharing of physical assets much 
cheaper and easier than ever, giving rise to the so-
called “sharing economy”. 
The companies under the umbrella of “sharing 
economy” are attracting increasing attention from both 
academics and practitioners, given their economic and 
social significance. Specifically, the “collaborative 
consumption” concept underlying the sharing 
economy, holds great potential in maximizing social 
welfare and contributing to environmental 
sustainability. Take cars for example. The possibility 
to rent a car in one’s neighborhood could lead to forgo 
the ownership, and turn to on-demand services. This 
could potentially reduce the total number of cars on 
the streets and thereby alleviate the congestion [2, 3]. 
Despite these promises, the majority of the peer-to-
peer sharing platforms still face the fundamental 
challenge of how to attract more users on board and 
get them engaged in the sharing activities facilitated 
by the platform. While user onboarding processes are 
designed and implemented in different ways -some 
platforms have used a simple registration form 
followed by a greeting message sent by email, while 
others have chosen to use the social login option via 
popular social networking platforms such as 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter - given the nature of 
these platforms, the collection of users’ personal data 
is inevitable for the completion of any transaction. In 
many cases, the amount of personal information 
necessary to get started creates an intrinsic barrier in 
users’ onboarding process, since the growing concern 
for online privacy might reduce users’ willingness to 
share personal information [4]. 
In this study, we are interested in understanding the 
effects of monetary incentives on users’ onboarding 
process at peer-to-peer car sharing platforms, where 
users have to provide sensitive information such as the 
registration information of a car and/or a digital copy 
of a driver’s license to engage in any sharing activities. 
There has been a long-lasting debate regarding the 
role of monetary incentives (financial reward) in 
motivating the disclosure of users’ personal 
information: some have argued that monetary 
incentives have positive effects on encouraging users 
to share more personal data with the merchandise [5], 
although the effect size varies depending on the 
amount of the monetary incentive [6]; others have 
found that the benefits of price discounts and 
personalized service are not effective in mitigating 
consumers’ privacy concerns [7]; or can even 
unexpectedly intensify the concerns of privacy [8]. 
In light of these conflicting views and findings, we 
conduct a randomized field experiment at a large peer-
to-peer car sharing platform by exogenously varying 
the amount of the incentive received by new users at 
the platform. Note that in the context of a peer-to-peer 
car sharing platform, new users experience at least two 
stages in their onboarding process: registration on the 
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service and booking a car. Here, we seek to understand 
the effects of monetary incentives in both stages. 
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that monetary 
incentives work no better than non-monetary 
incentives, such as email reminders, in motivating 
users to disclose personal information and engage in 
transaction on the platform. Such finding contributes 
to the growing literature on the role of monetary 
incentives on user behavior on digital platforms, and 
shed new light on the design and implementation of 
the various incentive schemes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The 
next section reviews the related literature, which is 
followed by a brief introduction of the focal digital 
platform and the experimental design. Section 4 
presents the empirical analyses and results. Section 5 
discusses our main findings and their implications, and 
outlines the directions for future work. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
2.1. Monetary incentives and privacy concerns 
 
According to the Oxford standard dictionary, an 
incentive is “a thing that motivates or encourages 
someone to do something”. Incentives can be 
monetary rewards (e.g., cash bonus or discount for 
desired behaviors) or non-monetary rewards (e.g., 
tangible recognition among peers, personalized 
services). Prior research across different domains has 
documented the effects of monetary incentives on 
modifying behavior [9]. For example, prepaid 
monetary incentives have shown to have a strong 
positive impact on the response rate in mail surveys 
[10], and store credits or coupons towards the next 
purchase are proven to be an effective sales promotion 
device [11, 12]. 
Drawing upon theories of self-disclosure, prior 
research in the context of e-commerce demonstrates 
that monetary incentives can be used as an effective 
means to induce consumers to release more personal 
information [13]. For instance, using a controlled lab 
experiment where subjects were exposed to different 
levels of monetary incentives ($0, $10, and $20), Hann 
et al. [6] found that individuals’ decisions regarding 
information disclosure depend on whether the 
monetary reward exceeds a certain threshold level. In 
another notable example, Beresford et al. [14] 
demonstrated through a field experiment that the vast 
majority of users did not hesitate in providing personal 
information, such as monthly incomes, in return of a 
price discount of €1 in their DVD purchases, 
suggesting that monetary incentives can effectively 
mitigate consumers’ privacy concerns. 
It is worth noting that in many cases, the 
motivation for introducing a monetary incentive may 
be different from how a user perceives it, and it is 
important to align users’ perception with the purpose 
of the incentive scheme. For instance, in a controlled 
lab experiment with student subjects, Andrade et al. 
[8] found that, contrary to the conventional view, 
monetary reward intensifies privacy concerns. Further 
investigation suggests that a significant proportion of 
the subjects considered the monetary reward “as 
decoys, which companies employ to inveigle 
individuals to reveal sensitive personal information” 
[8]. Such finding underscores the necessity to account 
for the confounding factors within the empirical 
context when examining the role of monetary 
incentives in shaping users’ information disclosure 
behavior. In the case of Andrade et al. [8], it is likely 
that the promised $10 check is perceived differently 
than coupons or price discounts (i.e., the latter clearly 
conveys the promotion nature). 
With this in mind, we adopt an experimental 
approach to explore the role of monetary incentives on 
users’ information disclosure behavior in the online 
environment. Unlike prior studies, which are largely 
focused on the role of coupons or price discounts in 
the traditional retailing sector, we have chosen to 
examine the effects of monetary incentives on user 
onboarding in a novel digital sharing platform. 
 
2.2. Digital Sharing Platforms 
 
While sharing of goods and services dates back to 
the beginning of the human history, the key enabler to 
those platforms operating at large-scale has been the 
continuous development of information and 
communication technologies [15]. 
The sharing economy is structured around the 
disintermediation of conventional channels of 
commerce in the exchange of products and services 
[16]. As such, there are two guiding principles that 
need to be taken into account when defining a sharing 
economy company. First, its business model is based 
on access, not on ownership. Second, it is grounded on 
crowd-based networks [17]. 
More specifically, platforms in the sharing 
economy: 
 
 Connects people that would not otherwise do 
business together. 
 Create economies of scale to bring together 
supply and demand. 
 Mediate in the relationship between supply and 
demand, and create a trustworthy environment. 
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The emerging sharing platforms have disrupted 
many industries, which in turn led to significant 
changes in many aspects of our life. Take the car-
sharing platforms for example. Recent studies [18] 
have found that peer-to-peer sharing of cars enabled 
by such platforms is associated with significant 
reduction in miles travelled, gas consumption, and car 
ownership. 
Given the socioeconomic significance, it is 
important to understand how different incentive 
schemes affect users’ onboarding process, which is 
crucial to the viability and success of sharing 
platforms. Here, we seek to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of users’ behavior during the initial 
onboarding process under different incentive schemes, 
and offer useful implications for the practical design 
of sharing platforms. 
 
3. The Field Experiment 
 
3.1. CarShare 
 
CarShare (a pseudonym), the company we have 
partnered with in this study, is one of the oldest online 
peer-to-peer car-sharing platforms in Europe. 
Originating in the early 2000’s, when five neighbors 
decided to share a car, the company has now grown 
into a major player in the car-sharing business. 
At CarShare, a booking is accepted immediately 
when the requested car is available and the necessary 
insurance is arranged. This removes the inherent 
barrier for renting a car between peers, and thereby 
makes it convenient for users to share their cars. The 
ultimate goal of CarShare is to reduce the need for 
additional cars (and thereby contribute to the energy 
and environmental targets) by facilitating users to 
share their cars, optimizing the use of cars. 
 
3.2 Experimental Design 
 
To understand the impact of incentives in the 
sharing economy, we conducted a randomized field 
experiment on new users of CarShare from April to 
July in 2016. The experiment was seamlessly 
integrated in the user onboarding processes, focusing 
on the communication of incentives via email 
reminders sent to the new users on the platform. 
Users who would like to rent a car on the platform, 
would need to provide personal details such as name, 
gender, age, address and telephone number, along with 
a digital copy of their driver’s license. In other words, 
the requirement of personal data is the main hurdle to 
user onboarding. 
To motivate users to disclose their personal 
information, and make their first bookings on the 
platform, we incorporate both monetary as well as 
non-monetary incentives. 
The monetary incentives include discount coupons 
of different values, which can be redeemed upon first-
time booking. The non-monetary incentive is in the 
form of a simple reminder (see Appendix for more 
details). The subjects in this experiment were new 
users who had already signed up, but not completed 
their profile (name, gender, address) after 24 hours 
since registration. They were randomly assigned to the 
following groups: 
 
 Control: Subjects within this group did not receive 
any treatment and is solely used for control. 
 Group 1: Subjects within this group received an e-
mail with a reminder to complete their profiles. 
 Group 2: Subjects within this group received an e-
mail with a reminder to complete their profiles, and 
a discount coupon of €5 for their first trips. 
 Group 3: Subjects within this group received an e-
mail with a reminder to complete their profiles, and 
a discount coupon of €10 for their first trips. 
 
The emails for both Group 2 and 3 contained a 
discount coupon code that users could redeem 
immediately upon completing their profiles. Since 
booking a car is only possible with a completed 
profile, the introduction of coupon codes would not 
affect the user on-boarding process, i.e., it is not 
possible for any user to bypass the self-disclosure 
stage and redeem the coupon in the booking stage. 
The experiment ran over the course of 10 weeks. 
On each day, the system performed an automatic 
check on the new sign-ups to validate whether they 
had already completed their profile within 24 hours, 
and if not, these users would be randomly assigned to 
one of the four treatment groups. This process was 
automated using heuristics that ran every morning on 
a relational database management system. 
To measure the response of users towards the 
email, both the click-through-rate as well as the open-
rate were tracked. The email contained a tracking 
pixel, which triggered a counter when the email was 
opened. Click-through was tracked on the only button 
in the email, guiding users to complete their profile. 
We first conducted a trial experiment to see if there 
were errors in the emails, targeting or elsewhere. This 
was important, since everything that runs live on a 
company environment is prone to errors. No errors 
were identified and the data from the trial experiment 
were included in the final data-set of our study. 
We ensured that all the users within their treatment 
groups received the email reminders. When an email 
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was sent successfully, this was logged and could be 
used to get matched against the user ID, and exclude 
any user who did not receive the full treatment.  
Concurrently, we also identified 35 instances 
where the account was not created by a human, which 
were classified as spam, and were removed from the 
dataset. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
Over the 10-week experiment period, we observed 
a total of 2315 sign-ups1, where 1360 users either 
immediately provided the required information during 
the initial registration process or did so within 24 
hours. The remaining 955 users did not provide the 
required personal information after the first 24 hours 
upon registration and, thereby, were randomly 
assigned to the four treatment groups described above. 
To obtain an initial understanding of the 
population in the dataset, we first conducted some 
descriptive analysis. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the 
demographic information of the 955 subjects. 
As can be seen from Table 1, among the users who 
disclosed their personal information, most (48.8%) are 
between the ages 18-55, roughly equally distributed 
across age-groups, while only 6.8% of the population 
of our study is above 55 years old.  
 
Table 1. Age Distribution 
Age Frequency Percentage 
18–25 122 12.7 
26–35 139 14.6 
36–45 97 10.2 
46–55 108 11.3 
56–65 47 4.9 
65 + 18 1.9 
Total 531 55.6 
Missing 424 44.4 
Total 955 100.0 
 
Overall, 44.4% of the subjects in our study (424 
users) did not reveal their age information. Further, as 
shown in Table 2, the gender distribution of our 
subjects in the study is 18.2% females and 24.1% 
males, while more than half of the subjects in our study 
(550 users or 57.6%) did not provide their gender 
information. As mentioned above, new users do not 
need to provide their age, gender or driving license 
upon sign-up, however, such information is necessary 
to activate the account at CarShare and rent a car. 
 
                                                 
1 We have filtered out the accounts created by spammers based on 
the email address provided during the sign-up process. 
Table 2. Gender Distribution 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Missing 550 57.6 
Female 175 18.3 
Male 230 24.1 
Total 955 100.0 
 
Table 3 presents an overview of the experiment 
results with respect to users’ self-disclosure. Overall, 
239 users were assigned to the control Group, among 
which 41 provided personal data; 240 users were 
assigned to Group 1 (simple reminder), among which 
51 disclosed personal information; 246 users were 
assigned to Group 2 (simple reminder + €5), among 
which 53 disclosed personal information; and 230 
users were assigned to Group 3 (simple reminder + 
€10) where 47 of them disclosed personal information. 
Overall, approximately 80% of the subjects did not 
provide their personal data. 
 
Table 3. Users’ Self-Disclosure  
Treatment 
Condition 
Details not 
provided 
Details 
provided 
Total 
Control 198 41 239 
Reminder 189 51 240 
Reminder 
+ €5 191 55 246 
Reminder 
+ €10 182 48 230 
Total 760 195 955 
 
Since only about 20% of the subjects in the focal 
population (i.e., the 955 users who did not provide the 
required information after the first 24 hours upon 
registration) provided their personal information such 
as age and gender, we were not able to run a full 
randomization check. Nevertheless, a post-experiment 
check shows that among the users who disclosed 
themselves under the control and three treatment 
conditions, the age distribution is quite similar to that 
of the users who provided these details spontaneously 
(see results from Table 1 and Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Post-Experiment Randomization Check 
Age Control Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
18–25 32 26 27 29 
26–35 37 36 33 27 
36–45 24 25 26 25 
46–55 26 26 31 22 
56–65 10 10 13 12 
65 + 5 4 3 2 
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To test the effects of incentives (reminder email 
and discount coupons), we performed a series of Chi-
square tests to determine whether there was any 
significant difference between different treatments in 
terms of information disclosure. 
Specifically, we compared the disclosure rate 
between each of the three treatment groups and the 
control group: i) no reminder (control) vs. a simple 
reminder (p-value=0.25), ii) no reminder (control) vs. 
a reminder plus a €5 discount (p-value=0.15), iii) no 
reminder (control) vs. a reminder plus a €10 discount 
(p-value=0.30), as well the disclosure rate between 
non-monetary treatment, low-monetary treatment and 
high-monetary treatment. No significant difference 
was found in terms of disclosure rate. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Users’ Self-Disclosure 
Rate with Chi-square Test  
 Control  Group 1 Group 2 
Group 1: 
Reminder 
0.25 
 
  
Group 2: 
Reminder 
+ €5 
 
0.15 
 
 
0.77 
 
 
Group 3: 
Reminder 
+ €10 
 
0.30 
 
0.92 
 
0.69 
 
In addition to users’ information disclosure, we are 
also interested in the impact of different incentives on 
the conversion rate of actual booking. Table 6 presents 
an overview of the conversion regarding account 
activation. 17 users (7.1%) from the control group 
made the booking during the experiment period. 
Among the three treatment groups, the simple 
reminder treatment (Group 1) yields the highest 
conversion rate (11.7%). 
 
Table 6. Users’ Account Activation  
Treatment 
Condition 
Account not 
activated 
Account 
activated 
Total 
Control 222 17 239 
Reminder 212 28 240 
Reminder 
+ €5 226 20 246 
Reminder 
+ €10 204 26 230 
Total 864 91 955 
Note: Accounts are activated only when users make the 
first booking on the platform. 
 
                                                 
2 When we group the subjects from Group 1 and Group 3 and 
compare the conversion rate between this merged group with control 
group, we get a p-value of 0.07. 
Following a similar procedure as above, we also 
test whether the observed differences in conversion 
rate shown in Table 6 are statistically significant. 
Table 7 presents the results of the Chi-square tests. 
Although the differences are not statistically 
significant at the traditional level of p ≤ 0.05, when 
comparing Group 1 (simple reminder) and Group 3 
(reminder plus a €10 discount) with the control group, 
we do observe marginally significant difference, i.e., 
users who received a simple reminder or a reminder 
with a €10 discount coupon were more likely to make 
bookings on the platform2. On the contrary, subjects 
in Group 2 (simple reminder plus a €5 discount) were 
no different than those in the control group in terms of 
their actual booking behavior. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of Users’ Account 
Activation with Chi-square Test 
 Control Group 1 Group 2 
Group 1: 
Reminder 
0.08 
 
  
Group 2: 
Reminder  
+ €5 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
Group 3: 
Reminder  
+ €10 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.90 
 
 
0.24 
 
 
Finally, we also checked whether the conversion 
rate conditional on users’ self-disclosure is different 
across the four groups. Tables 8 and 9 summarize these 
findings. Specifically, while none of the treatment 
groups show any significant difference from the 
control group (conditional conversion rate is 41%), a 
low monetary incentive seems to perform worse than 
a simple email reminder (p-value=0.05) and a high 
monetary incentive (p-value=0.07). 
 
Table 8. Users’ Account Activation Conditional 
on Self-Disclosure 
Treatment 
Condition 
Account not 
activated 
Account 
activated 
(%) 
Total 
Control 24 17 (41%) 41 
Reminder 23 28 (55%) 51 
Reminder 
+ €5 35 20 (36%) 55 
Reminder 
+ €10 22 26 (54%) 48 
Total 104 91 (47%) 195 
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Table 9. Comparison of Users’ Account 
Activation Conditional on Self-Disclosure with 
Chi-square Test 
 Control  Group 1 
 
Group 2 
 
Group 1: 
Reminder 
0.20 
 
  
Group 2: 
Reminder  
+ €5 
 
0.61 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
Group 3: 
Reminder  
+ €10 
 
0.23 
 
0.94 
 
0.07 
 
At the outset, the results from Table 7 and Table 9 
suggest a U-shaped effect of monetary incentives, that 
is, a low level of monetary incentive may be worse 
than a non-monetary incentive and a high level of 
monetary incentive in motivating users to actively 
engage in the transactions on the platform. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of different 
incentives on user onboarding behavior using a 
randomized field experiment at a large peer-to-peer 
sharing platform. We find that contrary to the 
conventional view, coupons or financial rewards is 
ineffective in motivating users to disclose their 
personal information in the initial onboarding stage. 
However, as soon as the users move to the next 
stage in their onboarding journey, a simple reminder 
email can work as effectively as or even better than 
monetary incentives in persuading them to convert to 
active users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study that directly compares the effects 
of different incentives (monetary vs. non-monetary) 
on users’ privacy disclosure and actual behavior with 
an experimental design seamlessly incorporated in the 
onboarding process of a real-world company. 
Our findings need to be interpreted with caution. 
Reminder emails have been proven useful in this study 
for users to activate their account. However, including 
additional price discount in the reminder emails does 
not necessarily improve such conversion. This 
particular finding contradicts the results of the extant 
literature (e.g., [5] and [14]), and is also distinct from 
the results reported in [8], where the provision of a 
reward unexpectedly intensified the privacy concern. 
Note that the authors of [8] posited that such 
negative effect of financial reward might be, from the 
perspective of subjects (students), due to inadequate 
compensation for disclosing sensitive information. In 
a similar vein, the insignificant effect associated with 
the monetary incentives in our study may be attributed 
to the low perceived value of the monetary 
compensation for personal data. Specifically, the 
discount of €5 or €10 may only constitute a very small 
portion of the total rent of a car for a certain period (for 
instance for a week). Therefore, such monetary 
incentive could not render any stronger effects than a 
simple reminder email in encouraging users to disclose 
personal information. 
Second, in the context of car sharing, it might be 
much more sensible for customers to provide their 
driving license information during booking instead of 
the registration process; when customers are already 
determined to initiate a car booking, a small discount, 
when compared to a reminding email, might be only 
considered as icing on the cake, but not the sufficient 
incentive to induce different behavior. 
 
5.1. Implications 
 
From the theoretical perspective, while our study 
cannot reconcile the inconsistent findings of the extant 
literature on monetary incentive and privacy 
disclosure, it provides strong evidence for users’ 
unwillingness to trade off personal identifiable 
information with a low purchase discount. Such 
finding suggests the indirect psychological effect 
associated with monetary incentives may work in the 
opposite direction to the direct price effect and thereby 
crowd out the desired behavior (i.e., disclosure of 
personal information) at the sharing platform. In this 
regard, the findings from the current study bear some 
similarity with the results from [19] where the authors 
demonstrate that while effective in inducing larger 
volumes of reviews, monetary incentives are less 
effective than social norms (non-monetary incentives) 
in generating long reviews. In light of such findings, a 
promising way to improve the conversion rate during 
the on-boarding process could be a combination of 
monetary incentive and social norm. A full treatment 
of this topic is beyond the scope of our current paper 
and we will leave it for future work. Our findings also 
provide implication for practice, as we provide 
managers with novel insights for better understanding 
user behavior in the sharing economy, and into the 
mechanisms that contribute to the onboarding of new 
users. Further, we demonstrate that users’ sensitivity 
to incentives differs across different stages in the 
onboarding process. In particular, when they have 
established the initial relationship (e.g., disclose their 
personal information) with the platform, a simple 
email reminder (non-monetary incentive) can work as 
effectively as monetary incentives in motivating the 
users to further engage in transactions at the platform. 
This is good news for many start-ups in the sharing 
economy, as user-onboarding is vital to the survival 
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and success of those companies but they typically face 
tight budget constraints. 
 
5.2. Limitations 
 
The current study bears several limitations. To start 
with, the measurement of email opening is not perfect, 
although it has been widely adopted in the majority of 
randomized field experiments that leverage emails to 
assign treatments. The reason is that all emails were 
sent to the registered users before a loyal relationship 
was established between the platform and those users, 
some email clients might block the images containing 
the tracking pixel, and thereby not all opens could be 
tracked. In other words, only the connection between 
the treatment and the final action (disclosure of 
personal information and booking) could be reliably 
tracked. It is possible that some observed conversion 
in the treatment groups is purely voluntary (e.g., users 
who did not open the email but returned to complete 
their profile after 24 hours of registration) and not 
driven by the assigned treatments. 
Second, the fact that emails were sent at the same 
time each day could also be a weakness, given that 
some users received their email later than others 
compared to the moment of signup. 
Finally, while we have a reasonably large sample, 
since we do not observe all the demographic 
information from the entire sample of users, it is not 
possible to discover nuances in users’ privacy 
disclosure. This also limits our ability to interpret the 
counterintuitive findings from the experimental data. 
 
5.3. Future Work 
 
In the current paper, we have primarily focused on 
the effect of monetary incentives on users’ information 
disclosure and short-term engagement (i.e., first-time 
booking) at digital car-sharing platforms. Future 
research can incorporate non-monetary incentives 
such as social norms [19] to further understand users’ 
sharing behavior. Further, it is worthwhile to dig into 
the long-term effect of various incentives. 
To this point, our current study serves as a useful 
starting point, and our empirical setup provides rich 
opportunities to explore interesting phenomena and 
design problems in the emerging digital sharing 
platforms.  
 
5.4. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of monetary 
incentives on user onboarding at digital sharing 
platforms. We demonstrate that monetary incentives 
work no better than non-monetary incentives (e.g., a 
simple email reminder) in encouraging users to 
disclose personal information and to actively 
participate in the transactions of peer-to-peer sharing 
platforms. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Automatic email sent upon initial registration3: 
                                                 
3 The emails presented here are English translations of the original 
ones which were written in the local language (non-English).  
Email reminder sent after 24 hours of registration: 
 
 
 
Email reminder with monetary incentive sent after 24 
hours of registration: 
 
SUBJECT:  
FIRSTNAME, please complete your profile! 
Dear FIRSTNAME, 
Great that you signed up at CarShare! Before you can 
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please 
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete 
the information. You can also upload your license there 
so we can verify your data. 
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this 
email, we are glad to help. 
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE 
SUBJECT:  
Reminder: We want to get to know you better! 
Dear FIRSTNAME, 
Great that you signed up at CarShare. Before you can 
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please 
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete 
the information. You can also upload your license there 
so we can verify your data. 
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this 
email, we are glad to help. 
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE 
SUBJECT:  
€DISCOUNT, for a complete profile! 
Dear FIRSTNAME, 
Great that you signed up at CarShare. Before you can 
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please 
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete 
the information. You can also upload your license 
there so we can verify your data. 
Once you complete the profile, you can redeem the 
following voucher (code: XXXXX) of €DISCOUNT 
for your first booking. Respond quickly and enjoy 
your discount! 
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this 
email, we are glad to help. 
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE 
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